

# **Between the Reds and the Yanks: Turkey During the Cold War**

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Bachelor Thesis  
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**Tomas Bata University in Zlín**  
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**Tomas Bata University in Zlin**

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Soysal, Ismail. Soguk Savas Dönemi ve Türkiye: Olaylar Kronolojisi, 1945-1975 [Cold War Period and Turkey: Chronology of the Events (1945-1975)]. Istanbul: Isis Yayıncılık Ltd, 1997.

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## **ABSTRAKT**

Tato práce zkoumá vztahy mezi Tureckem a Spojenými státy během prvních let studené války. Práce popisuje příčiny studené války. Dále zkoumá důvody, které vedly tureckou vládu k tomu, aby se přiklonila na stranu Spojených států namísto Sovětského svazu a také jak toto rozhodnutí vedlo k závislosti Turecka na USA. Vývoj této závislosti je v práci popsán s přihlédnutím na důležité mezníky v dějinách Turecko-Amerických vztahů.

Klíčová slova:

Studená válka, Turecko, Sovětský svaz, Spojené státy americké, Spojené království, NATO, Evropa, Maršalův plán, Zákon o půjčce a pronájmu, Bosporská úžina, Korejská válka, *USS Missouri*

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the relations of Turkey with both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War's early years. The thesis first documents the origins of the Cold War. It then describes the reasons the Turkish government chose to side with the U.S. instead of the Soviets during the Cold War and how this decision led to Turkish dependency on the U.S. in all aspects. The thesis then charts the development of this dependency by focusing on important milestones in Turkish-American relations.

Keywords:

Cold War, Turkey, Soviet Union, United States of America, United Kingdom, NATO, Europe, Marshall Plan, Lend and Lease, Bosphorus Straits, Korean War, *USS Missouri*

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## INTRODUCTION

After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death in 1938, Turkey's demand for foreign aid and support never diminished. While sixty years ago Turkey was trying to be a part of NATO to secure its defense against the Soviets, now the country is trying to be a member of the European Union, largely for economic benefits.

However, in the 1940s and 50s, the world was much more chaotic than present. World War II and the Cold War that followed divided the world between two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries had interest in Turkey. While Turkey was geographically close to the Soviets, politically it was closer to the United States. Turkey's geopolitical position and its dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions were raising the stakes. The superpowers, realizing the potential of the region, both tried to incorporate Turkey into their spheres of influence. While one was doing so with open threats, the other was using devious ways.

Due to ongoing threats the Turkish army could not be discharged, the economy was getting worse, and the pressures, both internal and external, were increasing. It was time for Turkey to choose a side. As in most decisions, there were positive and negative consequences.



## ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

### 1.1 WORLD WAR II

On 1 September 1939 at 4:45 am, the German battleship Schleswing-Holstein opened fire on the Polish garrison situated in Danzig. This was the start of World War II, the bloodiest war in history, in which about 50 million people died and countless others were wounded. The war lasted from 1939 to 1945, until the surrender of Germany on 8 May and Japan on 2 September. It was the first and hopefully last conflict to use nuclear weapons in human history. World War II not only caused the death of millions but also led to dramatic changes in political and economic balances. At the end of the war, the world fell in to the hands of two super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.1.1 Who is who? Allies vs Axis

Benito Mussolini rose to power in 1925 in Italy and Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933. Europe now had two powerful fascist dictatorships, which soon became a threat to the rest of the continent and eventually the world.<sup>2</sup>

The initial spark that ignited World War II, as previously mentioned, was the invasion of Poland by German military forces on 1 September 1939. In response to this aggression, France, Britain, Australia and New Zealand declared war on Germany two days later. It was not until the Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii on 7 December 1941 that the United States also became involved. A day later, the U.S. declared war on

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<sup>1</sup> Bradley Lightbody, "Invasion of Poland," BBC, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion\\_poland\\_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_poland_01.shtml) (accessed April 3, 2011); J. M. Roberts, *Twentieth Century: The History of the World, 1901 to 2000* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999), 432; Helen Cleary, "V E Day," BBC, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ff7\\_veday.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ff7_veday.shtml) (accessed April 3, 2011); Helen Cleary, "VJ Day," BBC, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ff7\\_vjday.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ff7_vjday.shtml) (accessed April 3, 2011); Wayne LeBaron, *America's Nuclear Legacy* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 16; Francis Snyder, "The Origins of the Nonmarket Economy: Ideas, Pluralism & Power in Ec Anti-Dumping Law About China," *European Law Journal* 7, no. 4 (December 2001): 378. [http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL\\_Images/Journal\\_Samples/EULJ1351-5993~7~4~135/135.pdf](http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Journal_Samples/EULJ1351-5993~7~4~135/135.pdf) (accessed April 3, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> BBC, "Benito Mussolini Ataturk 1883-1945," [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/mussolini\\_benito.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mussolini_benito.shtml) (accessed April 19, 2011); BBC, "Adolf Hitler," [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/adolf\\_hitler](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/adolf_hitler) (accessed April 19, 2011).

Japan, and this was followed by a further declaration on 11 December against Italy and Germany.<sup>3</sup>

In 1943 the key allied leaders, who subsequently became known as the *Big Three*, held a conference in Tehran. This was the first of only two times that all three leaders, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, met during World War II.<sup>4</sup>

Other key members of the Allied forces apart from the Big Three who were not at the conference were China and France. Several countries that had maintained neutrality during the war, including Turkey, decided to join the allied powers after the victory of the allies became absolute with the surrender of Japan in August 1945. These countries symbolically joined the side of the allies in a conference held in San Francisco on 24 October 1945 when the allied leadership ratified a charter creating the United Nations, the purposes of which were “to maintain international peace and security,... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,...[and for the] adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.<sup>5</sup>

The axis powers formed by Germany, Italy and Japan were bound together by the Tripartite Pact signed in September 1940. According to this pact “Japan recognizes...the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe. Germany and Italy recognize... the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. [Japan, Germany and Italy] further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the Contracting Powers is attacked...”.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Roger Parkinson, *The Encyclopedia of Modern War* (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 133; Tim Cooke et al., *History of World War II: Origins and Outbreak*, vol. 1 of *History of World War II* (New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), 168; Roberts, *Twentieth Century*, 423; U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, “U.S. Declaration of War Against Germany,” <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-411211.htm> (accessed January 18, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> David Welch, *Modern European History 1871-2000: A Documentary Reader*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 122; *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>5</sup> Ismail Soysal, *Soguk Savas Donemi Ve Turkiye: Olaylar Kronolojisi, 1945-1975* [Cold War Period and Turkey: Chronology of the Events (1945-1975)] (Istanbul: Isis Yayıncılık, 1997), 3; The United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed January 18, 2011).

<sup>6</sup> The Avalon Project, “Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940,” <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/triparti.asp> (accessed January 19, 2011).

This pact was subsequently joined by Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania in November 1940, by Bulgaria early in 1941 and by Yugoslavia on 25 March 1941.<sup>7</sup>

The course of the axis powers dramatically changed when Hitler attacked Russia on 22 June 1941. While the Germans found initial success on the Russian front, before they managed to reach Moscow they were pushed back by Soviet forces. This was the beginning of the end for the Nazis. Two days after the Germans abandoned their attack on Moscow, Japan successfully attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. After much debate, but with the approval of President Truman, the U.S. later dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, the first on 6 August 1945, on Hiroshima, and the second on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. While many believe that these bombs ended the war, or were at least a major contributing factor, there are equal arguments to suggest this was just the desire of Americans to show off their powerful new weapon to get an edge over the Soviets. Regardless of the reasons, on 2 September 1945 the Japanese officially capitulated, signing a formal surrender on the *USS Missouri* battleship, which sat with a huge force of allied ships in Tokyo Bay. This enormous American war-machine would visit Turkey a year later, and it would be welcomed as a savior of the country.<sup>8</sup>

### 1.1.2 USA and USSR united against a common enemy

At the beginning of World War II, the United States was following its traditional policy of neutrality. During the third term of Roosevelt, the U.S. decided to make some changes in its foreign policy in order to combat the ongoing economic depression. Moreover, the United Kingdom, a consistent ally of the U.S., was in times of need because of the rising power of the Nazis in continental Europe, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill was appealing to the U.S. to take up arms. For these reasons, the Roosevelt administration

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<sup>7</sup> Cooke et al., *History of World War II: Origins and Outbreak*, 168; Marshall Dill, *Germany: a Modern History*, (USA: University of Michigan Press, 1970), 401-2.

<sup>8</sup> Roberts, *Twentieth Century*, 417; Turner Publishing Company, *USS Missouri (BB-63): "The Mighty Mo"* (Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 1998), 40, 71; Mark Weber, "Why the Atomic Bombings Could Have Been Avoided: Was Hiroshima Necessary?," *Journal of Historical Review* 16, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 4-11. <http://www.vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/16/3/Weber4.html> (accessed April 4, 2011); Robert Forczyk, *Moscow 1941: Hitler's First Defeat* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 60; John C. Davenport, *The Attack on Pearl Harbor: The United States Enters World War 2* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 71; Truman Library, "Notes by Harry S Truman on the Postdam Conference, July 17, 1945 President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers," [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/63.pdf](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/63.pdf) (accessed April 4, 2011); Tamra Orr, *The Atom Bomb: Creating and Exploding the First Nuclear Weapon* (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2005), 56.

prepared an aid program called Lend-Lease, which militarily supported the U.K., China and other allied nations from 1941 to 1945. The program became law on 11 March 1941 and by 1945 had provided a total of over \$49.1 billion of aid to the allied powers.<sup>9</sup>

In June 1941 when Hitler decided to invade Russia, Roosevelt decided to include the Soviets in the Lend-Lease program to stop German expansion. This step brought the United States and Russia closer to each other. During the program, the Soviets received aid in excess of \$12.5 billion. This aid significantly helped Russia expel the Nazis, which in turn dramatically contributed to the collapse of Hitler's Third-Reich.<sup>10</sup>

The Lend-Lease project not only cemented military relations, but also social relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Harry Hopkins, an official advisor to Roosevelt, commented on these strong relations after the Yalta conference in 1945. The Russians, he stated "... had proved that they could be reasonable and far-sighted and neither the President nor any one of us had the slightest doubt that we could live with them and get on peaceably with them far into the future. ..."<sup>11</sup>

### 1.1.3 Neutrality policy of Turkey

Peace at home [Turkey], peace in the world.<sup>12</sup>

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1933

The Ottoman Empire stood by the Germans in World War I to protect its decaying territories. The absolute defeat of the Germans brought to an end 623 years of Ottoman Rule despite their success on some fronts, such as Gallipoli. After the war, the Treaty of Sevres was prepared and the last remaining lands of the empire were shared between the allied powers. While Sultan Vahdettin was signing the treaty with the allies, on the other end of the country the Turkish National Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was gaining power and preparing the nation for an uprising. These efforts culminated in

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<sup>9</sup> Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 485-87; Lesek Maciazek, "Origins of the Cold War" (bachelor thesis, Tomas Bata University in Zlín, 2010), 30-31; Albert L. Weeks, *Russia's Life Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 23.

<sup>10</sup> Weeks, *Russia's Life Saver*, 23.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 520.

<sup>12</sup> Atatürk Kultur Dil ve Tarih Yuksek Kurumu Atatürk Arastirma Merkezi, *Ataturk'un Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991), 623.

victory for the Turks in the Independence War against the Greeks, Armenians and French; a victory later consolidated by the Lausanne Treaty on 24 July 1923.<sup>13</sup>

The modern Republic of Turkey was founded on 23 April 1923, and with this its foreign policy also changed. Due to the protracted battles fought during World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, both the army and civilians were exhausted. It was high time to leave the aggressive expansionist foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. The new government foreign policy became isolationist. Starting with the foundation of the country, until the death of Turkey's first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 1938, the country successfully maintained this policy.<sup>14</sup>

#### 1.1.4 Turkish – Soviet Relations during the War

The Turkish people had good relations with the Soviets during and after the Turkish Independence War. In fact, the first major international agreement for each of these newly founded countries was a friendship treaty called the Treaty of Moscow signed on 16 March 1921. However, these relations began to falter when Turkey signed a tripartite treaty with Britain and France on 19 October 1939. This treaty was criticized by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. According to the minister, Turkey had rescinded its careful maintained neutrality policy and placed itself in the orbit of a developing European War. He claimed that Turkey would be regretful of this action in the future. Despite this obvious threat by

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<sup>13</sup> Avalon Project, "Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey August 2, 1914," [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/turkgerm.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/turkgerm.asp) (accessed April 16, 2011); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Reform, Revolution and the Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*, vol. 2 of *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (1977; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 317-18; Cahit Alptekin, "Kaynakların Sahitliğinde Vahdettin Kimdir ve Neler Yapmıştır," <http://www.cahitalptekin.com/gorsel/showimg.php?file=/Makaleler/KAYNAKLARIN%20%DEAH%DDTL%DD%D0%DDNDE%20VAHDETT%DDN%20K%DDMD%DDR%20VE%20NELER%20YAPMI%DETIR%20Cahit%20Alptekin.pdf> (accessed April 16, 2011); Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, *History of Middle East* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2005), 355; B. V. Rao, *World History: from Early Times to A D 2000* (1984; repr., New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 2007), 317-18; Alim Ozturk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük 1 Ders Notu* (Ankara: MEB Egitek, 2007), 85.

<sup>14</sup> Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 85. [http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2008-03-tpq/nicholas\\_danforth.pdf](http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2008-03-tpq/nicholas_danforth.pdf) (accessed January 30, 2011); BBC, "Kemal Atatürk 1881-1938," [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/ataturk\\_kemal.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml) (accessed April 4, 2011).

Molotov, the Turkish government did not retreat and maintained its mutual relations with the British and French.<sup>15</sup>

This declaration deeply wounded Turk-Soviet relations for over a decade. Later, a letter received from the Soviets on 30 May 1953 stating that the Soviet Union did not have any land claims on Turkey and wished to reconsider the joint-defense of the Bosphorus, helped ease the tensions. However, it was still not clear to the Turkish if the Soviets had relinquished their demands for a naval base on Bosphorus or not.<sup>16</sup>

### 1.1.5 Turkish – American Relations during the War

Turkish – American relations dated back to Ottoman times. In the 1850s the Americans realized the potential of the natural sources in the Middle East.\* They increased the frequency of their visits in order to secure relations in the region. These commercial relationships were joined by political ones, which continued in parallel until the collapse of the Empire. When the Turkish Republic was founded, the Americans were still following the Monroe Doctrine and were removed from issues concerning Europe. For this reason, relations in the Middle East continued purely on the basis of commerce. The Americans appeared more trust-worthy than many European countries, such as the U.K. and France, in the eyes of most Turkish politicians. At least Turkey and the U.S. had never warred, and the Americans were not following any imperialistic goals in the Middle East, unlike the British.<sup>17</sup>

Turkish – American relations continued without serious problems until June 1941. The Turkish government acknowledged the approach of Germans troops and signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler, on 18 June 1941, to protect itself from a future attack. While

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<sup>15</sup> L. Carl Brown, ed., *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The international relations of regional and Outside Powers* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 79; Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 1, no.1 (January 1997), under "Change in Turkey's Stance: NATO Membership and its Aftermath,"

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a3.html> (accessed February 1, 2011); Dogan Avcioglu, *Turkiye'nin Duzeni: Dun-Bugun-Yarin* [Order of Turkey: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow] (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1996), 1:539.

<sup>16</sup> Fahir Armaoglu, *20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi (1914 – 1995)* [Political History of 20th Century] (Istanbul: Alkim Kitabevi, 2010), 721.

<sup>17</sup> Yavuz Guler, "The Relationship Between Turkey and USA in the Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1795-1914," *Journal of Kirsehir Education Faculty* 6, no. 1 (2005): 238-9. [http://kefad.ahievran.edu.tr/archieve/pdfler/Cilt6Sayi1/JKEF\\_6\\_1\\_2005\\_227\\_240.pdf](http://kefad.ahievran.edu.tr/archieve/pdfler/Cilt6Sayi1/JKEF_6_1_2005_227_240.pdf) (accessed April 19, 2011); Semih Bulut, "Ataturk Donemi Turkiye – ABD Iliskileri 1923-1938" (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, 2008), 190-194; At that time the Middle East was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Any economic or political act was taking place with the permission of the Empire.

Turks were awaiting a condemnation from the British for their action, the reaction of the Americans shocked the Turkish government. Despite the opposition of McMurray, the U.S. ambassador in Ankara, the United States government suspended all aid to Turkey. According to scholar Cuneyt Akalin, during the war Turkey was selling chrome to the Germans; which was essential for their arms industry, and this was also one of the reasons that the Americans choose to discontinue their aid. However, President Roosevelt was a farsighted leader, and realized the importance of Turkey for the defense of the Middle East and Mediterranean region. In 1941 he decided to include Turkey into the Lend-Lease program organized by the United States government to support European countries against the Germans. As the amount of the aid increased, so the neutrality policy of the Turks weakened in favor of the American side.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Cuneyt Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 - 1952* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 2003), 163-4.

## TURKEY DURING THE COLD WAR

Turkey was an important protagonist in the Cold War. During the Second World War, it had kept its neutrality as much as possible. However, at the beginning of the Cold War, the Turks realized that, if the Turkish government insisted on this neutrality between the Americans and the Russians, it would have been confronted by the danger of military or political attacks. This adverse pressure moved Turkey to co-operate with the Western powers, rather than the Soviets. However, Turkey's neutrality was affected by pushing and pulling: on one side from fear of the Soviets and the other, the generous economic aid from the U.S.<sup>19</sup>

### 1.2 SOVIET DEMANDS ON THE BOSPORUS STRAITS

The Dardanelle and Istanbul straits (hereafter referred to as *the straits*) were under Ottoman control from the occupation of Istanbul by the Turks in 1453 until the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca was signed with Russian Empire in 1774. By signing this treaty, the Ottomans lost their dominion over the Black Sea, and free movement of Russian merchant ships in these waters was permitted.<sup>20</sup>

In 1923, thanks to the Treaty of Lausanne, a month after the new Turkish Republic was founded the Turks regained their rights to the straits. These rights did not give total autonomy to the Turks, but for such a newly established country the extent of these rights were considered acceptable. Thirteen years later, when the Montreux Convention agreement was signed, Turkey gained the right to remilitarize the straits and control the passage of non-Turkish military ships. This was the start of a series of disagreements between the Soviets and Turkey.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Ahmet Sozen, "Changing Fundamental Principles in Turkish Foreign Policy Making," (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, San Diego, USA, March 22-25, 2006), 1 <http://ir.emu.edu.tr/staff/asozen/pub/sozen%20isa2006.pdf> (accessed April 20, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Lynn A. Levine, *Frommer's Turkey*, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, 2006), 394-95; Murat Fidan, "Importation-Exportation Between Ottoman Empire and Russia Across Black Sea Between 1797 – 1800 (According to Nu: 87/5 Russian Judgements Register)," *Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakultesi Tarih Bolumu Tarih Arastirmalari Dergisi* 28, no. 45 (2009): 63-84. <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/18/941/11711.pdf> (accessed March 13, 2011).

<sup>21</sup> Yucel Guclu, "Regulation of the Passage Through the Turkish Straits," *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 6, no. 1 (March-May 2001): 1-4. <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume6/March-May2001/guclu07.PDF> (accessed April 4, 2011); Christos L. Rozakis and Petros N. Stagos, "The Turkish Straits," in *International Straits of the World*, ed. Gerard J. Mangone (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 42.



Stalin had complained about the passage of several German military vessels through the straits during the Second World War. When he saw that the war was favoring the Soviets, his displeasure became more vocal. In October 1944, during the Moscow conference, Stalin was the first to suggest a change to the Montreux Convention. Churchill mentions this in his telegraph to Roosevelt on 22 October 1944 as “U.J. [Stalin] also raised formally the Montreux Convention, wishing for modification for the free passage of Russian warships. We did not contest this in principle. Revision is clearly necessary, as Japan is a signatory and Inonu [Prime Minister of Turkey] missed his market last December. We left it that detailed proposals should be made from the Russian side. He said they would be moderate.” It is clear that the big three were in consensus concerning the revision of the straits. However, the demanding proposals from the Soviets would soon bring conflict to this coalition.<sup>22</sup>

The official suggestion for changing the Montreux Convention agreement was brought to the table for the first time by the Soviets during the Yalta Conference in 1945. In his speech Stalin emphasized several points and explained the reasons for the suggested changes. He also noted that, because of the new situation with the Japanese Empire, Russia’s growing world influence should be reflected in the convention. Moreover, the convention was subject to the League of Nations, which was now an old dysfunctional international organization established immediately after the First World War. Stalin highlighted that according to the current convention the Turkish have the right to forbid transportation in the straits not only during war but also when they feel threatened and consider the danger of war existing. Stalin believed that Turkey could throttle Russia at any time, and this was an intolerable situation for the Soviets. Stalin’s comments belied the severity of the Soviets feelings on the straits issue. The Russians wanted to have a say in the control of the vital tracts that connected them to the warm Aegean and Mediterranean waters.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> US Department of State, *The Department of State Bulletin* 16, (Jan-Mar 1947): 146. <http://www.archive.org/details/departmentofstat1647unit> (accessed April 4, 2011); Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (New York: RosettaBooks, 2002), 291.

<sup>23</sup> United States Department of State, “Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945,” *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers* (1945): 903-4. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1945> (accessed March 14, 2011); The Japanese Empire was one of the signatories of the convention. However, Stalin believed that instead of faraway Japanese, a Black Sea country, Russia, should have more rights of the convention.

Churchill accepted the suggestion from Stalin concerning these alterations to the convention as long as “the independence and the integrity of Turkey are guaranteed.” Roosevelt, on the other hand, gave an example on how smoothly the border between the U.S. and Canada works, adding that “it is understandable that the U.S.S.R. wishes to have an ice-free port in the west.” These leaders concluded that the foreign ministers of these three countries should come together and work on this issue at the following meeting.<sup>24</sup>

While behind closed doors such decisions were being made, on 19 March 1945 Turkey was astonished with the abrogation by the Soviet government of the Turkish-Soviet Agreement signed in 1925. The Soviet justification for this was that great changes had taken place during the Second World War. However, as Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow noted, the main aim of this decision was the desire of the Soviets to solve the conflicts on the straits to their advantage.<sup>25</sup>

The Turkish government responded to the notification of termination on 4 April 1945 by requesting a detailed list of changes. On 7 June, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov met with Sarper in Moscow. The Soviets made reference to the Turkish-Soviet friendship treaty signed in 1921 and mentioned that it was signed at such a point in time when the Soviets were weak and since that time some conflicts about land ownership, which had to be solved, had occurred. It was clear by these words that Molotov was referring to a change on the northern borders of Turkey.\* Sarper protested that no Turkish government could explain this to its public, and he could not deliver this demand to Turkey. These Soviet demands were once more forwarded to Sarper by Molotov on 18 June. Due to the inflexible behavior of the Soviets, once more a chance of a new friendship treaty between the two parties was shelved.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> A. Suat Bilge, “An Analysis of Turkish-Russian Relations,” *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 2, (June-August 1997): 3. <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/June-August1997/volII2ANANALYSISOFTRKISH.pdf> (accessed April 4, 2011); Kamuran Gurun, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1991), 276; Suat Bilge, *Guc Komsuluk, Turkiye-Sovyetler Birligi İlişkileri, 1920-1964* (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayınları, 1992), 266.

<sup>26</sup> Gurun, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 278-84; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 37; Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – I, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 193; Turgay Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960* (Ankara: Ebabil Yayıncılık, 2006), 84-6; Later on, these land-claims were supported by Russians based on the research of two Georgian professors published in the newspaper named *the Communist* in Tbilisi on 20 December 1945. According to this research, up to the Turkish city Giresun the whole Black Sea shore was a part of Georgia and needed to be returned to the Soviet Union. *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi* 2, (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 70.

According to scholar Turgay Merih, the land claims of the Russians caused more negative reaction than their naval base demands on the straits and led Turkey closer to the U.S.A. In fact if this agreement had not been abolished, contends Merih, Turkey would have never participated in NATO. The Turks announced their decision: they chose to lean diplomatically towards the West.<sup>27</sup>

The Potsdam Conference was another meeting where the straits were an important topic of discussion. On 22 July, the Turkish straits were to be discussed right after Churchill brought up Turkey's concerns. According to Churchill, the Turks were worried by the demands of the Soviets on the straits, land claims on the northern borders and Russian troops waiting on the Bulgarian border. After this warning from Churchill, Molotov gave a letter to him and Truman in which Soviet views were clearly expressed.<sup>28</sup>

According to this letter the Soviets wanted:

- Abolition of the Montreux Convention
- Co-Control of the sea-traffic of the Black Sea
- The Establishment of Soviet naval bases in addition to Turkish ones, in order to protect the straits from hostile attacks against the Turk and Soviet nations.<sup>29</sup>

Churchill emphasized that these demands were different from the ones he had discussed with Molotov and Stalin and mentioned that the Turks will never accept them. Truman, on the other hand, said that he is not in a position to deliver an opinion and suggested postponing the topic. Discussions on the situation of the straits continued throughout the conference. On the last day of the conference, on 1 August, Truman tried unsuccessfully to persuade Stalin about the importance of the liberty of water routes all over the world.<sup>30</sup>

On the same day that the closure protocol of the conference was signed, the leaders of the three countries also concluded that the Montreux Convention was outdated and should be reviewed. It is added that direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government had to be held. After these discussions in Potsdam no solution to the problem of the straits was found. Moreover, the Turkish government was frightened

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<sup>27</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 86.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Gurun, *Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri*, 292; Cuneyt Arcayurek, *Seytan Ucgeninde Turkiye* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 295; Bilge, *Guc Komsuluk, Turkiye-Sovyetler Birliği Iliskileri, 1920-1964*, 288.

by the Soviet demands, but what really concerned them was the silence of the U.S. and British governments while all this was taking place.<sup>31</sup>

After these three countries decided to have separate negotiations with Turkey, the United States sent a note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 2 November 1945.<sup>32</sup>

The Americans summarized their stance in four points:

1. The straits [have] to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times,
2. The straits [have] to be open to the transit of warships from Black Sea powers,
3. Save for an agreed limited tonnage in times of peace, passage through the Straits should be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and
4. Certain changes should be made to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations system for that of the League of Nations after the elimination of Japan.<sup>33</sup>

This diplomatic note from the U.S.A. was well received by Turkish authorities. It was clear that Turkey wanted the U.S. to be part of the straits issue, and this note gave them the opportunity. The British followed with a similar note on 21 November 1945.<sup>34</sup>

The Soviets broke their silence with a note on the straits sent to the Turkish government on 7 August 1946. The Russians were pointing out that the Montreux Convention was not sufficient to protect Black Sea states. They also listed the names of enemy military vessels that had been allowed to pass through the straits by the Turkish government during the Second World War.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Avalon Project, "The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945: (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945," [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/decade17.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp) (accessed April 4, 2011); Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Basnur Matbaası, 1968), 268-9.

<sup>32</sup> US Department of State, *The Department of State Bulletin* 16 (Jan-Mar 1947): 144, <http://www.archive.org/details/departmentofstat1647unit> (accessed April 4, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> United States Department of State, "The Near East and Africa," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1945*, 3, (1945): 1266, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1945v08> (accessed March 18, 2011).

<sup>34</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 93; *Ayin Tarihi* (December 1945), 15.

<sup>35</sup> Cemil Bilsel, "The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence," *The American Journal of International Law* 41, no. 4, (October 1947): 739, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193087> (accessed March 18, 2011); US Department of State, *The Department of State Bulletin* 16 (Jan-Mar 1947): 146, <http://www.archive.org/details/departmentofstat1647unit> (accessed April 4, 2011).

Soviet demands can be summarized thus:

- The straits have to be opened to the passage of all countries.
- The straits have to be open only to the passage of military vessels belonging to Black Sea states.
- The straits have to be closed to the passage of the military vessels of non-Black Sea states with the exception of special cases.
- A New straits agreement must give the control of the straits to Turkey and countries that have shores on the Black Sea.
- Administration and the defense of the straits must be carried out by Turkey and Russia.<sup>36</sup>

The note was sent not only to the Turkish government but also to the U.S.A. and England. It was first replied to on 19 August by the U.S. and on 21 August by England. The Turks were first waiting to see the attitude of the U.S. and England, so that they could formulate their response accordingly. After the arrival of the American and British notes, the Turkish government finally replied on 22 August.<sup>37</sup>

While the U.S. did not argue against the first three points of the Soviet note, they were against the rest. Americans were emphasizing that the regime of the straits not only consider the Black Sea states but also all other countries including the U.S.A. Besides, they were adding that Turkey remain mainly responsible for the defense of the straits and in case of an attack, the United Nations Security Council could take action.<sup>38</sup>

The Turks in their response to the Soviets were following the Americans' lead, and they added that the abolition of the Montreux Convention and furthermore, demands on mutual defense of the straits by Turks and Russians were against the sovereignty rights of Turkey. In addition, the Turks were refuting the charges that they had allowed enemy vessels free passage during the Second World War. They concluded that the Montreux document is balanced and does not need to be abolished. On the other hand, it was accepted that the technical sides of the convention were outdated and required updating.

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<sup>36</sup> *Ayin Tarihi* (August 1946), 72-4.

<sup>37</sup> Akalın, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 199.

<sup>38</sup> Fahir Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri* [Turkish-American Relations with Documents] (Ankara: TTK Yayinlari, 1991), 148-9.

Turkey ended by stating that the demands of the Soviets which affected the sovereignty of Turkey might cause serious objections all over the world. In general, the response of Turkey to the Soviets might be considered calm and constructive. With their final words, the Turks were trying to keep the straits issue at an international level rather than making it a Turkish-Russian debate.<sup>39</sup>

A second Soviet note on the straits was delivered to Turkey on 24 September 1946. In order to exclude the U.S.A. and England from debates, this time the Soviets sent the note only to the Turkish government. However, Turkey informed the Americans and British of the Soviet note. Once more, the Russians repeated their demands, explaining them in great detail. They were emphasizing that the Black Sea is an inland sea which makes the Turkish straits unique and incomparable to similar international straits around the world.<sup>40</sup>

Even though a copy of the note was not sent to the Americans, the first reply was made by them on 9 October 1946. Once more the U.S.A. was repeating that the straits problem cannot be solved only between the Soviets and Turks. The right to defend the straits has to belong only to the Turks and any further changes to the Montreux Convention have to be discussed in a conference where all signatories of the convention will be invited. Almost the same suggestions were reiterated by the British.<sup>41</sup>

Each passing day the Americans better understood the importance of Turkey against Soviet expansionism. Soviets were supporting communist rebels in Greece and strong-arming Turkey into making changes to the Montreux Convention. If America lost influence in these areas, Soviets would have free access to the Mediterranean waters.

The importance of Turkey was noted in October 1946 by the State Department's Director of Near East and African Affairs Loy Henderson: "Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." The Americans recognized that if Russia could reach the Mediterranean, there would follow a transformation of the geopolitically important Middle East countries

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<sup>39</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 200-1.

<sup>40</sup> Kamuran Gurun, *Dis Iliskiler ve Turk Politikasi (1939'dan Gunumuze Kadar)*, (Ankara: SBF Yayinlari, 1983), 196; *Ayin Tarihi* (September 1946), 46-51.

<sup>41</sup> Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 150-1; Gurun, *Turk-Sovyet Iliskileri*, 308.

into Soviet satellite states. This would in turn affect the interests of the U.S. in these areas.<sup>42</sup>

The Turkish government, after feeling the support of the Americans and British, replied to the Soviet note on 18 October 1946 and stayed the course. Nevertheless, this time the Turks sent the response not only to the Soviets but also all other signatories of the convention, with the exception of Japan. This should be considered as an effort of the Turkish government to move the case into the international arena. Surprisingly, the Soviets neither replied to this note nor requested a conference. The validity of the agreement came to an end in 1956 after twenty years. The Soviets did not even notify the Turkish government or ask whether they wanted to continue the agreement or not. The year long correspondences began with the abrogation of the Turkish-Soviet Agreement in March 1945 and resulting in tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey had finally come to an end. The high-tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey began to dissipate.<sup>43</sup>

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviets tried to restructure their foreign policies; hence the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov published an announcement where he put the responsibility for the policies on Stalin. Then he declared that the Soviets had abandoned their former land claims and demands on the defense of the Turkish straits. In the following years there were not any problems between the two countries neither about the straits nor about the northern borders. Even today, the Montreux Convention prevails with some minor changes, and the control of the straits is held by the Turkish government.<sup>44</sup>

Russian pressure on the Bosphorus straits deeply influenced the direction of Turkish foreign policy. The Soviet demands provided the Turkish bourgeoisie and the government the chance to steer the wheel of the country away from Atatürk's socialist policies to the Western capitalist approach. Exaggerated and deliberately misinterpretations of the demands by a biased media caused an antipathy among the public against the Soviets. Demonstrations were organized in Istanbul, and pro-communist newspapers and publishing houses were attacked. Anti-communism was rising with every passing day. The Russians,

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<sup>42</sup> Loy W. Henderson, "Memorandum on Turkey," Washington, October 21 1946, IAT, Roll 1. Quoted in Barin Kayaoglu, "Bringing Them Together: Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy, 1945-1950," Master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2005, <http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0002825.pdf> (accessed October 17, 2010).

<sup>43</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 202-3.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.; Aldo Chirchop, Ted L. McDorman, and Susan J. Rolston, eds., *The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 206.

Turkey's closest ally in the Independence War, were now being seen as its biggest threat to the country's liberty. As it was said once, *le Roi est mort, vive le Roi!* [The King is dead. Long live the King!]. Now the new ally of the Turkish government was the U.S.A.



### 1.3 ARRIVAL OF THE *MISSOURI* TO ISTANBUL

While diplomatic notes were being dispatched back and forth between the Turks, Soviets and Americans between 1945 and 1946, a small but very meaningful visit took place. The sudden visit of the *USS Missouri* to Istanbul was going to change the axis of the Turkish foreign policy. The Americans were determined to show their power against Russian expansionism with this visit.<sup>45</sup>

In 27 February 1946, based on a suggestion by U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Truman ordered that the *USS Missouri* would visit Istanbul in order to return the dead body of the former Washington ambassador for Turkey, Munir Ertegun. However, the ambassador's death had occurred almost two years prior. These tenuous justifications led many to interpret the visit as a U.S. effort to taunt the Soviets. Moreover, it was also known that the Americans had been waiting for an opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean region after the British had lost their influence in that area.<sup>46</sup>

According to scholar Cuneyt Akalin, the visit of the *Missouri* to Istanbul was a propaganda attack by the Americans. This hypothesis appears highly probable, especially when seen in the context of the situation, and while considering that much of the written material published in the newspapers was provided with the help of the Americans.<sup>47</sup>

After a fifteen day journey, the *USS Missouri* finally anchored in the Bosphorus near Istanbul on 5 April 1946. The people of Istanbul welcomed the American Navy seamen with huge excitement and happiness. Actually, preparations for the greeting had started long before the arrival of the ship. Every corner of Istanbul was cleaned. This included the brothels of the city, which were overhauled and prostitutes were given thorough medical checks to get ready for the visit of the Navy seamen. Shopkeepers were warned about cheating money from the visitors and police were notified to be gentle with them.

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<sup>45</sup> Gurun, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 305; an American warship on which the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, an agreement that had concluded the Second World War, had been signed.

<sup>46</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: Notional Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (California: Stanford University Press, 1992), 123.

<sup>47</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 207-8.

Regardless of which ideology they held, journalists were writing flattering words about Americans on paper. The *USS Missouri* was to be regarded as a savior by the public.<sup>48</sup>

The *USS Missouri* was not only welcomed with enthusiasm by the public, but also by the government. High ranking officers and American journalists were entertained by the Turkish president Ismet Inonu and invited to a dinner by the chief of the general staff Kazim Orbay. In fact, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Edwin Wilson, mentioned with surprise all of these preparations and the wonderful hospitality in his letter to Washington. He was explaining the enormity of the attention the public of Istanbul had paid to the visitors, stating that it was the most significant greeting that the U.S. navy had ever received. He added that with this visit the Turks were sure that Americans were finally aware of the Soviet demands that were threatening Turkey and the peace, and furthermore that the defense of the region must be continued according to United Nations principles.<sup>49</sup>

At the same time, Truman in a speech in Chicago on 6 April 1946, emphasized the importance of the region where Turkey is situated: "... Near East and Middle East, we find an area which presents grave problems. This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance... It is easy to see therefore, how the Near and Middle East might become an arena of intense rivalry between outside powers, and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict."<sup>50</sup>

The four day visit of the *USS Missouri* ended on 9 April. The public farewell for this enormous war machine was filled with the same enthusiasm as had welcomed it. Steamboats were rented by the Istanbul Maritime Administration, for the crowd wanted to see the *Missouri* before it departed. In-deed, in his speech to American journalists, President Inonu summarized all this attention of the public and the government with one

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<sup>48</sup> Battleship Missouri Memorial, "USS Missouri History 1941-1951," 4, <http://www.ussmissouri.com/documents/EduRe-link-1-HISTORY-1941-1950a.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2011); Nevzat Ustun, *Türkiyedeki Amerika*, (Istanbul: Var Yayinlari, 1969), 25-7.

<sup>49</sup> Arcayurek, *Seytan Ucgeninde Turkiye*, 315; Metin Toker, *Turkiye Uzerinde 1945 Kabusu* (Ankara: Akis Yayinlari, 1971), 101 quoted in Turgay Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960* [Cold War and Turkey, 1945-1960] (Ankara: Ebabel Yayincilik, 2006), 98.

<sup>50</sup> US Department of State, *The Department of State Bulletin* 14, no. 353 (April 1946): 623, <http://www.archive.org/details/departmentofstatx1446unit> (accessed March 23, 2011).

sentence: “The closer the ships belonging to the U.S. Navy are to us, the better for us it is.”<sup>51</sup>

After departing from Istanbul, the *Missouri* stopped at various Mediterranean harbors, such as Piraeus, Algiers and Tangiers on its way back to Norfolk in the U.S. Among these harbors Piraeus had a primary significance. At the time, communist rebels supported by the Soviets were causing problems in Greece. This supports the theory that, as in Istanbul, by visiting Greece, the U.S. wanted to show its power and presence once more to the Soviets. Now both Turkey and Greece were more inclined towards being under the influence of the Americans rather than the Russians.<sup>52</sup>

The Soviets were aware of all these changes and were not impressed. They showed their reaction with a diplomatic note concerning their demands on the straits on 7 April 1946 as mentioned above. However, despite this the Americans continued to send their fleets to Turkey. On 23 November 1946, the *USS Randolph* aircraft carrier and ships belong to the U.S. Navy, the *Donner*, *Perry* and *Fargo*, visited Izmir harbor. Izmir newspapers welcomed Americans with the same headings in English: *Wellcome*. A year later, on 5 May 1947 a U.S. Navy fleet consisting of the *USS Dayton* (-cruiser), *Leyte* (-aircraft carrier), *Purdy* and *Bristol* (-destroyers) were anchored in Istanbul and once more welcomed by the public. In the following years visits from American fleets and personnel became more frequent and more permanent.<sup>53</sup>

Years later, in 1963, former President of Turkey Ismet Inonu admitted how much the Americans had deeply influenced Turkish institutions, with these visits and aid packages. Inonu expressed this frankly in the following words:

We want [Inonu] to carry out a more independent and honorable foreign policy. Everyone is talking about the same thing but, how am I supposed to do this? I have decided to transfer the cause to the officers. They will do detailed studies and prepare suggestions. Are they able to do this? Around all of them [officers]

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<sup>51</sup> Vatan, April 7, 1946; Battleship Missouri Memorial, “USS Missouri History 1941-1951,” 4; *Cumhuriyet*, April 10, 1946.

<sup>52</sup> Battleship Missouri Memorial, “USS Missouri History 1941-1951,” 4.

<sup>53</sup> Ibrahim Bozkurt, “II. Dünya Savası Sonrası Amerikan Missouri Zirhlisi’nin İstanbul Limanı’ni Ziyareti Uzerine Degerlendirmeler,” *Cagdas Turkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi* 6, no. 15 (Fall 2007): 271; *Ayin Tarihi*, (November 1946), 76; *Ayin Tarihi*, (May 1947) <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx> (accessed March 24, 2011).

are foreigners, so called ‘experts’. They are trying to seduce [the officers]. If they cannot succeed in this, they are trying to impede them. If not, they are taking countermeasure. When I assign a duty, before the result came to me, it was known by Washington. I am now hearing the result from the [American] ambassador before my own [Turkish] officers. ... These things are like that, they pledged you the worlds as a prophet. After you have signed, they arrive promptly the next day. Their personnel have arrived, their equipment has arrived [and] their bases have arrived. Then try to rip them off if you can. They will never go away. However we have to go over this problem without losing time. Otherwise you can neither make independent foreign policy nor detached domestic policy. [If not, you] plough the sands. Yet, do not suppose that it is an easy job. You can never know what will come over to you...<sup>54</sup>

This confession demonstrates the real, unseen side of the American aid. While the U.S. was making the country’s industry dependent on American spare parts and goods, Americans were also insidiously entering the institutions and establishments and were influencing the decision makers accordance with U.S. interests.

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<sup>54</sup> Ahmet Efeoglu and Turk Celil, “Amerikanci Egitim Duzeni – Fulbright Anlasmasi,” Acik Istihbarat, <http://www.acikistihbarat.com/Haberler.asp?haber=8263> (accessed March 24, 2011).

## 1.4 FROM THE LEND-LEASE POLICY TO THE MARSHALL PLAN

The Republic of Turkey was founded on 23 April 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his comrades in arms as a result of Turkish War of Independence. With the abolition of the Sultanate, the Ottoman Empire officially had come to an end and reform movements rapidly assumed authority. New factories were being established, schools and universities were being opened. There was an attempt to establish a secular republic and westernization was the main ideology of the government. However, after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk the progressive and independent economy and social policies of the country started to decline. This decline was amplified by the hard conditions brought about by the Second World War.<sup>55</sup>

Even though Turkey was a neutral power in the war, it had affected the country's economic and social values deeply. The world's biggest war was taking place right next to their country. German troops were marching towards Turkey, conquering the Balkan states on their way. On 18 June 1941, four days before the Germans attacked the Soviets; the Turkish government signed a non-aggression pact with the Nazis. This had assured Turkey's security and gave some brief comfort to the government. Then, on 22 June, the Turks were able to breathe a sigh of relief, for as a result of German offensive on the Soviets, the Nazi threat on Turkey disappeared.<sup>56</sup>

During the war, between 1941 and 1944, Turkey received \$95 million in military aid under the Lend and Lease Program established by the U.S.A. to support European armies against the Nazis. According to Roosevelt, the defense of Turkey was important for the defense of the U.S.A. Indeed, the aid worked as was intended, helping European countries to defeat German troops. However, after the war, the payback of this aid started to distress many governments. The U.S. government realized this and cancelled much of the debt

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<sup>55</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Turkey," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm> (accessed April 5, 2011); Abdullah İlğazi and Husamettin İnanc, "The Repercussions of The Possible Change within Turkey's Political and Social Structure Over Atatürk Principles during The EU Negotiation Process: The Example of Laicism," *Ozean Journal of Social Science* 1, no. 1 (December 2008): 53. [http://ozelacademy.com/OJSS\\_v1n1\\_6.pdf](http://ozelacademy.com/OJSS_v1n1_6.pdf) (accessed April 5, 2011).

<sup>56</sup> Wolfgang G. Schwanz, ed., *Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004), 183; Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 161.

from these countries, including Turkey. Moreover, the Turks paid \$4.5 million to the U.S. which gave them ownership rights for the materials and equipment they received during the war. Ironically however, this equipment caused more trouble than benefits to the Turkish government in later years.<sup>57</sup>

After the Germans were defeated at the end of the war, the world was divided between the two big powers: The Soviets and the Americans. While Turkey was much closer to the Soviet Union geographically, ideologically the government was closer to the Americans. Also the Soviet demands on the straits were threatening the independence of Turkey and this was creating unrest amongst the Turks. One by one Turkey's neighbors were becoming satellite states of the Soviet Union. With each passing day Turkey was becoming more and more isolated. Turkey's longtime ally Great Britain, fatigued by the war, was planning to abandon its imperialistic claims on the region. The Greeks were struggling with communist rebels, Bulgaria had already fallen under Soviet influence and Iran could not be shared by the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans.<sup>58</sup>

Under these circumstances Turkey could not sensibly demobilize its army, and this was causing a huge economic burden. Almost half of the budget in 1946 was spent on the army's expenses. Actually, at the end of the war the Turks had \$250 million in gold and exchange reserves. Yet, due to the possibility of war, these reserves could not be spent and were being held in case of such an emergency.<sup>59</sup>

Besides all this, a note given to the American Foreign Minister by England's U.S. ambassador Baron Inverchapel on 24 February 1947 changed the Turkish-American relations significantly. Finally, instead of dealing with the British for the grants, the Turkish government could negotiate directly with the Americans, an outcome which they had been looking forward to for a long time. Ambassador Inverchapel was emphasizing the

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<sup>57</sup> Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, "Tarihçe," <http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/savunmaSanayiimiz/Sayfalar/tarihce2.aspx> (accessed March 28, 2011); Gonlubol, *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (1919-1973)*, 167-8; Baskin Oran, ed., *Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik, 2001), 1:525; Baris Ertem, "Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in Turkey-USA Relation," *Balikesir Universitesi Journal of Social Sciences Institute* 12, no. 21 (June 2009): 384.

<sup>58</sup> Library of Congress Country Studies, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," [http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/germany\\_east/gx\\_appnb.html](http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/germany_east/gx_appnb.html) (accessed April 10, 2011); Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye - 1, Olaylar - Belgeler, 1945 - 1952*, 179-90.

<sup>59</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 102; Ahmet Karahan, review of *Turkiye Iktisat Tarihi 1908-1985*, by Korkut Boratav, *Altini Cizdiklerim*. <http://www.altinicizdiklerim.com/ozetler/TurkiyeIktisatTarihi.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2011).

importance of Greece and Turkey and acknowledging the danger that both faced from Soviet influence. He also added that, due to the financial difficulties they were both dealing with, the British government had been unable to support the Turks [or the Greeks] in the form of money and military equipment and "... therefore, the British government asks whether the U.S. Government is willing to undertake the major share of this burden." With respect to the calculations made by the British, the amount of foreign currency needed by Turkey was approximately \$250 million for the years 1947 and 1948. On the same day, in his memorandum to the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was claiming that if these two countries were left unsupported, their independence would be threatened and this could lead to the fall of Greece and Turkey as well as the rest of the Middle East to Russian control. Truman also understood the importance of this aid, and after he consulted with the military and ministries, he decided to take this issue to congress.<sup>60</sup>

On 12 March 1947 Truman was ready to give his famous speech, which was later to be known as the Truman Doctrine, in front of congress. Truman started his speech by giving a detailed report on the economies of Greece and Turkey and criticized the behavior of the Soviets in that region. He mentioned that the British government cannot provide the financial or military support needed by these countries after 31 March and added "We are the only country able to provide that help."<sup>61</sup>

Truman's requests can be listed as;

- Authority to provide Greece and Turkey with \$400 million aid until 30 June 1948.
- Permission to send civilian and military personnel to both countries to help in the reconstruction.
- Authority to host and train selected personnel of these countries in the U.S.A.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> United States Department of State, "The Near East and Africa," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1947* 5, (1947): 42-4, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1947v05> (accessed March 28, 2011); Under Secretary of State.

<sup>61</sup> The President of the United States, speaking for the Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, on March 12, 1947, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, *Cong. Rec.* 171, 3. [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf) (accessed March 29, 2011).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-5; Only \$100 million of it to the Turkish government.

This speech was made into a law in one session of the U.S. Congress on 22 May 1947. It was welcomed with great pleasure by the Turkish government. The Prime Minister Recep Peker appreciated that England wanted to discharge some of its load to the U.S.A. and he believed that the United States' support would not only to support Turkey but also to strengthen world peace. However, in the third section of the law, there was an article which disturbed some members of the government. According to this article, Turkey should give permission for "free access of United States Government officials for the purpose of observing whether such assistance is utilized effectively and in accordance with the undertakings of the recipient [Turkish] government." This article concerned Turkey's U.S. ambassador Ragip Baydur, and he shared his discomfort with the United States Turkish ambassador Wilson. He mentioned that this article appeared to be against the independence of Turkey, and could lead to a control of Turkey by the U.S. In the end, Wilson convinced him that this would not be the case, and with this the agreement signed on 12 July 1947 Turkey started to receive the aid. The Turkish parliament had approved this assistance law on 5 September.<sup>63</sup>

Americans were seeing this aid as a demonstration of their power over Soviet Russia, and they wanted it to be heard and seen by as many people as possible. To ensure this, an article in the agreement was included that stated: the Turkish government should give permission to members of the U.S. press, giving them detailed information on the usage of the aid, and also the government should make full and regular publications about the reason, source, nature, extent and the progress of the aid.<sup>64</sup>

However the American public was not totally satisfied with this aid and the way of its delivery. They believed that the problems of Greece and Turkey should be solved by the United Nations, not by the U.S. itself. To bypass these contradictions, an important article clarifying the termination possibilities was added to the law. According to the article, the aid planned to be given can be terminated partially or completely; if the Turkish government demands; or if the United Nations found the aid unnecessary; or if the President of the U.S. decides so. Moreover, to control if the aid is used properly and to

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<sup>63</sup> Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 160-2; Ayin Tarihi (April 1947), 161 <http://byegmgovtr.xn--ler-1la8h.net/ayintarihidetay.aspx?Id=528&Yil=1947&Ay=4> (accessed April 18, 2011); Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 106.

<sup>64</sup> Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 163.



carry out the communication with the Turkish and American governments, the United States Ankara ambassador Wilson was assigned as the Chief of Mission in Turkey.<sup>65</sup>

After various research and studies carried out in Turkey, the officers of the United States recommended that the U.S. government provide \$100 million for Turkey's development. Nevertheless, in the agreement signed between the governments the amount of the aid was not specified. This gave the Turkish government an opportunity to ask for a rise several times. Between the years 1947 to 1951 the amount of the military aid given to Turkey had reached \$400 million.<sup>66</sup>

During the war the Turkish government had received aid under the Lend and Lease program. This was followed by aid provided by the Truman Doctrine. Yet, all this military aid consisted of was the equipment used during the war by the U.S. army. Still they were more modern than the ones Turkish army had. Under the Truman Doctrine, military equipment worth \$100 million was given to Turkey. Primarily for the maintenance and spare parts of them, the Turkish government needed to devote \$143 million of its budget to upkeep. This caused Turkey to spend its reserves of foreign currency. The equipment spare parts were also being imported from the U.S., which caused an irreparable damage to Turkey's trade balance. Every passing day, Turkey was getting more indebted to the U.S.A.<sup>67</sup>

Thanks to the Truman Doctrine, the military capacities of Turkey, Greece and several other states of the Europe were raised. The United States was the only country which enhanced its economy after the war. On the other hand, Europe including Great Britain was suffering from food shortage and economic instability. Soviet efforts in France and Italy to take control of the governments of these countries by communist parties were seen as a threat by the U.S. Under these conditions, the U.S. decided to support independent Europe by means of aid. However, as seen with the Truman Doctrine before, supporting only the military of these countries was not enough, and it was not sustainable.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 163; Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 106.

<sup>66</sup> Oran, ed., *Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1:536.

<sup>67</sup> Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, "Tarihce,"

<http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/savunmaSanayimiz/Sayfalar/tarihce2.aspx> (accessed March 28, 2011).

<sup>68</sup> Fahir Armaoglu, *Siyasi Tarih 1789-1960*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1975), 769-70.

At that moment, the Foreign Minister of the U.S., George Marshall, came with a project which later became known as the *Marshall Plan*, a program intended to bandage the wounds of the European countries. Starting from July 1947 in a conference held in Paris, sixteen European countries including Turkey started to work and discuss the *European Recovery Plan* introduced by Marshall. While the conference was going on, Turkey stated that it needs \$615 million. However, Americans were not willing to give that amount of money to the Turkish government. This caused a big reaction and disappointment in Turkey. Yet, after the Turkish governments' firsthand contact with Americans, the amount and the scope of the aid was widened a bit. Therefore, almost a year later on 4 July 1948 the two governments finally signed an agreement under the name of "Turkish-American Economic Cooperation". While the Americans were celebrating the U.S. Independence Day on 4 July, the Turks had lost their economic independence.<sup>69</sup>

Thanks to this agreement, between the years 1948 to 1952, the Turkish government received a total of \$225 million in aid. According to the directives of the American officers, most of the money was being invested to improve the agricultural production of Turkey. The Americans were trying to turn Turkey into an agriculture supplier for European countries. As a result, at the beginning of the 1950's Turkey became one of the world's leading wheat providers.<sup>70</sup>

The way of life in Turkey also started to change radically. American cars and home appliances were flooding into Turkey and these American goods were seen as a symbol of status: Hollywood movies were shown at theatres: Superman comics were being read by children: New fashion trends, as sported by American actors, were being adopted by eager teenagers, who wore Levi's jeans (often acquired by nefarious means). As Celal Bayar, the president of Turkey between the years 1950-1960 once said, "Turkey will become a little America." Thinking, working and living like an American was in vogue, and thanks to

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<sup>69</sup> Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 168; Ayin Tarihi, (February 1948) <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx> (accessed April 01, 2011).

<sup>70</sup> Embassy of the United States Ankara, Turkey, *The Marshall Plan's 60th Anniversary*, [http://turkey.usembassy.gov/marshall\\_60.html](http://turkey.usembassy.gov/marshall_60.html) (accessed March 30, 2011); Oran, ed., *Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1:540.

American aid, not only had the economy of the country started to become dependent to the U.S., but also the society had started to become Americanized.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ergun Babahan, “Turkey is now “little America”,” *Today’s Zaman*, September 4, 2010. [http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=220933](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=220933) (accessed April 1, 2011); Oran, ed., *Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1:537.

## 1.5 FORMATION OF NATO AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO TURKEY

After World War II, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., no longer united against a common enemy, grew estranged because of the many conflicts of interest between them. While the Americans were trying to reconstruct Western Europe by means of aid, Eastern Europe and Balkans were being reshaped under communist regimes. Europe had started to divide into two. Defense pacts from the both sides would soon be necessary.

On 17 March 1948, a group of western European countries, including France, Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, worried by the expansion of the Soviets, signed the Treaty of Brussels. This aimed to develop and strengthen economic and cultural relations between these countries. Later that year, in September, signatories of the treaty established a pact, known as the ‘Western Union Defense Organization’ against any future Soviet attacks. Yet, these countries knew that without the support of the United States, they would not be able to resist the Soviets.

Starting with George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” in 1946, in which he was listing the ways to deal with the Soviets, the isolation policy of the Americans was exchanged with a containment policy. According to this new policy, western European, the Balkans and Southeast Asian countries had to be supported economically and militarily. Democracy and the freedom of the American system had to be imposed on the public of these countries, and by these means the expansionism of the Soviets had to be stopped. As a result of this, on 4 April 1949 the United States of America, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and the participants of the Treaty of Brussels signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. This agreement formed the biggest militarily and political association in the world. It began life on 24 August under the abbreviation of NATO.<sup>72</sup>

During the foundation process of the organization, Turkey declared its desire to be included several times, as a charter member or a regular member, but did not receive any

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<sup>72</sup> John Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe: an Introduction to the European Union*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 296; Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 120-3; Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and into the 21st Century*, (1999; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24-5.

reply. During 1948 and 1949, the Turkish government became more persistent. Although the reasons for this were varied, there were some key concerns. Firstly, the Turks were not feeling secure due to the Soviet demands on the straits and their expansionist policy over the Balkans. Being a part of such a treaty, formed with the leadership of the U.S., would help the defense of Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish government wanted to keep on receiving the aid given by the Americans. They believed that if Turkey was not a part of NATO, that these grants could be lost. For most of the Turks and for the government, NATO membership would not only bring military advantage but would also symbolize the liberalization and the democracy of the country. One should not forget that in the 1940s Turkey was still being ruled under a one party regime.<sup>73</sup>

For Turkish Prime Minister Hasan Saka the relations between Turkey and the U.S. should be cemented with a military alliance. Turkey did not want to be left out of such a comprehensive defense organization. The government was not only knocking on the Americans' door, but also the British. Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Necmettin Sadak offered cooperation in Middle East affairs to the British government. He was trying to associate the security of the Atlantic region and the Middle East, saying that the "Atlantic alliance is not wide enough". However, the British declined this proposal. According to the English, the timing was not appropriate.<sup>74</sup>

Despite Turkey's diligent lobbying and official application, in November 1948, the American and British ambassadors sent a refusal note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the note, this treaty was a geographical defense concept designed only for the Northern Atlantic area. Notwithstanding, the British and the Americans described the organization in geographical terms, and on March 1949 they invited Italy - which can be considered a Mediterranean country, rather than a European one. The invitation of Italy caused great anger and disappointment to the Turkish government. The government felt that Turkey was not considered a European country anymore. Seeing a growing resentment in Turkey, on 9 August 1949 Turkey was invited to join the European Council -an organization founded by ten European countries on 5 May 1949- to appease its

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<sup>73</sup> Oran, ed., *Türk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1:543-4.

<sup>74</sup> *The Times*, (February 10, 1948) quoted in Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 245; Oran, ed., *Türk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, 1:545

anger. Even though the Turks seemed satisfied, they were still angry having not been invited as a founding member.<sup>75</sup>

### 1.5.1 Quest for a Mediterranean Pact

Actually, the Turkish government knew from the beginning that the geographical location of the country would not allow it to be a member of NATO. Being out of the Atlantic Pact, Turkey was seeking security, and for this reason they had prepared a plan of a new regional defense organization called the Mediterranean Pact. Turkey was trying to attract U.S. and British attention to this new plan; however they were not planning to extend the Atlantic Pact's defense umbrella more. Truman was trying to limit the military expenses, and the British were following the American lead.<sup>76</sup>

At the same time, unexpected changes were taking place in the Balkans and the Middle East, which were giving the Turks a chance to impose their Mediterranean Pact plan. The Soviets had formed an organization called Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) with participation of eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. This pact caused discomfort among the Americans, and it was considered to be in response to the European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.), which had been founded in 1948 to administer the American aid provided by the Marshall Plan. An organization, formed by 18 Western European countries including Greece and Turkey, all had participated in the O.E.E.C. to benefit from the American aid. It should also be noted that England was consistently losing power in the Middle East, and a war had started soon after the foundation of Israel.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Huseyin Bagci, *Türk Dis Politikasında 1950'li Yillar*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: ODTU Gelistirme Vakfi Yayincilik, 2001), 11; Ayin Tarihi, (March 1949) <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx> (accessed April 02, 2011); George Harris, *Troubled Alliance* (Washington: 1972), 38 quoted in Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 244.

<sup>76</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 245-6.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 246; Library of Congress Country Studies, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," [http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/germany\\_east/gx\\_appnb.html](http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/germany_east/gx_appnb.html) (accessed April 10, 2011); OECD, "Organization for European Economic Co-operation," [http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_201185\\_1876912\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1876912_1_1_1_1,00.html) (accessed April 10, 2011); Since 1961 it has been known as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Realizing this, on 24 November 1948, the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, William D. Leahy prepared a note in which he summarized the strengths of Turkey and its geopolitical importance. According to Leahy, Turkey:

- Assures the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East regions,
- Prevents the expansion of the Soviets to bases in Eastern Mediterranean such as Crete, Cyprus and Rhodes,
- Controls the land-sea-air routes between the Soviet Union and the Suez Channel,
- Prevents the landing of the Soviets to the south.<sup>78</sup>

Also, Leahy realized the “military potential of Turkey, coupled with its high national spirit and geographic situation.” This spirit of resistance of the Turks could give sufficient time for the U.S. to react in the event of a Soviet invasion. However, according to Leahy, to make such spirit last, the U.S. aid had to continue.<sup>79</sup>

Even after the Turkish governments’ invitation, the Americans and the British did not want to be a part of the Mediterranean Pact. Soon after, the Turks also understood that they should spend their power on accession to NATO, instead of creating a new pact from scratch. This foreign policy was being supported by almost all of the members of the Turkish Parliament. From the most religious politicians to the liberal ones, the whole parliament believed that accession to NATO was necessary. This pro-Western foreign policy gathered speed when the Democrat Party rose to power by garnering 53.3% of the votes in the 14 May 1950 elections. The result was significant because it brought an end to twenty-seven years of a single party regime in the country.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> United States Department of State, “Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union,” *Foreign Relations of the United States* 4 (1948): 191, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1948v04> (accessed March 14, 2011).

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>80</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – I, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 259; Suleyman Gungor, “Elections on 14 May 1950 and the Depression in CHP,” *SDU Fen Edebiyat Fakultesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 21 (May 2010), 202 [http://sablon.sdu.edu.tr/dergi/sosbilder/dosyalar/21/21\\_11.pdf](http://sablon.sdu.edu.tr/dergi/sosbilder/dosyalar/21/21_11.pdf) (accessed April 19, 2011).

### 1.5.2 Others' Pain, Turkey's Chance: the Korean War

On 25 June 1950, an opportunity for the Turkish government to show its commitment to Western countries presented itself. A war in Korea broke out; the Northern part, under a communist regime, attacked the Southern democratic part of the country, which was under the influence of Western powers. The North Korean troops invaded Seoul in a short time, and the Southern government had to leave the country. Immediately on 27 January the United Nations Security Council invited member countries of the U.N. to give military support to South Korea. Sixteen members of the U.N. replied to this invitation, and one of these was the Turkish government. The Turkish Parliament was in a consensus to help Southern Korea; however the method of support was not decided. Should Turkey only symbolically condemn North Korea or send troops to fight at the front?<sup>81</sup>

Since the foundation of the republic in 1923, Turkey had never been involved in a military operation outside of its borders. Yet, for the new Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Korean War was a perfect chance to show the new governments' pro-western foreign policy. He believed that this could only be done by sending Turkish troops to Korea. On 25 July Turkey took the decision to provide a small force, under the command of the United Nations, of 4,500 armed soldiers. Turkey was the first country to respond to the U.N.'s call for action, after the Americans. Immediately after this decision, the Turkish government officially applied once more for membership to NATO. However, it was once more rejected by the NATO Council. It seemed like the plan of the Turkish government had failed.<sup>82</sup>

The first Turkish soldiers arrived in South Korea on 17 October 1950 and were involved in most of the important battles, such as those in Kunuri. The Turks performed admirably and helped the U.N. troops in minimizing casualties. When a ceasefire was declared on 27 July 1953, 721 Turkish soldiers had died, 2147 were wounded, 175 were

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<sup>81</sup> Turkish General Staff, "Turkiye'nin Kore Savasi'na Katilisi ve Savasin Turkiye icin Onemi," [http://www.tsk.tr/8\\_TARIHTEN\\_KESITLER/8\\_8\\_Turk\\_Tarihinde\\_Onemli\\_Gunler/kore\\_savasi/kore\\_savasi.htm](http://www.tsk.tr/8_TARIHTEN_KESITLER/8_8_Turk_Tarihinde_Onemli_Gunler/kore_savasi/kore_savasi.htm) (accessed April 19, 2011); Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 142.

<sup>82</sup> Mehmet Kursad Ordu, "Amerikan Kamuoyunda Kore Harbi 1950-1953" (master's thesis, Ankara University, 2008), 77. <http://acikarsiv.ankara.edu.tr/browse/3468> (accessed April 19, 2011); Turkey first applied to NATO as a one party regime on 11 May 1950. (Can Dundar, *Savasta Ne Yaptin Baba* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 2003), 4.)



missing and 234 were taken captive. In total almost five million civilians died, and the border between the North and the South remained largely unaltered. The only winner of the war was the American arms industry.<sup>83</sup>

Here it should be noted that, on 28 June, approximately three months before the Turkish troops arrived in South Korea, U.S. General William P. McBride had a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu and noted that according to his observations the Turkish army was not in very good condition and did not even have a single unit properly combat prepared in case of a war. It is really worth considering the motivation behind the Turkish government's decision in sending these unprepared soldiers to Korea just three months later. Moreover, General McBride was the one who decided on the number and the duty of the Turkish troops that were sent.<sup>84</sup>

### 1.5.3 On the way to NATO

In 1949 when the Soviets showed the world that they also had an atomic bomb, the United States decided to strengthen its containment policy to avoid potential Soviet aggression. The success shown in the Korean War by the Turkish army appealed to the interests of the United States. The need for the U.S.'s defense of Europe and the Middle East had increased. According to Akalin, the U.S. Air Force only had short-range bomber planes and to reach the Soviet military bases, they would have to take off from a relatively close distance. In the event of a Soviet attack, the defense of Europe could be supported from Turkey. For this reason the U.S. Armed Forces decided to offer associated NATO membership to Turkey to synchronize the defense of Europe and the Middle East in case of a potential Soviet attack. The Turkish government was not satisfied with this proposal. They knew that, to join such pact could be seen as a threat by the Soviets and because of the limitations of the associated membership, the United States could leave Turkey alone in case of a Soviet attack. However, in the end they agreed with the associated membership, believing this to be the first step on the way to full membership.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 144.

<sup>84</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 268-71.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 273; Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 147.

While the Americans and the British were trying to find the appropriate moment and justification for Turkey's accession into NATO, they found each other in the middle of a disagreement. According to the British General Brian Robertson, Turkey's membership to NATO should be tied to the British military quarters in the Middle East. The British still considered Turkey as a Middle East country. American Admiral Carney also considered Turkey as a Middle East country. However, according to him the Americans were the ones who supported the Turks military and economically and for this reason, Turkey should move according to American interests. The Turkish government was also of the same opinion as Carney. They would always prefer a co-operation with the Americans rather than the British. General Robertson noted that the biggest problem of the U.K. in Turkey was the Americans. According to him, the Americans were decisive. Moreover, they were having to spend a lot of effort and funds to train the Turkish forces. In short, he was trying to say that the Turkish government and its military were being manipulated by the Americans. These institutions were totally under the influence of the Americans.<sup>86</sup>

After various discussions and the tension between the Americans and the British, finally on September 1951, the NATO Council, gathered together in Ottawa, decided to invite Turkey as well as Greece to join NATO. During the discussions about NATO membership in the Turkish Parliament, 404 parliamentarians out of 406 supported the decision. Now there was not any obstacle preventing Turkey from becoming a member of NATO. Despite opposition from some smaller pact countries, such as Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Turkey finally joined NATO with the support of the United States on 18 February.<sup>87</sup>

The Turkish governments had finally fulfilled a long lasting dream. Turkish politicians believed that membership to the North Atlantic Defense Pact dispelled any possible risk of Soviet aggression. Turkey would also receive more aid and could co-operate directly with the U.S. without the intervention of the British. However, while moving to attain this membership to NATO, Turkey had sacrificed hundreds of soldiers in Korea, spent millions

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<sup>86</sup> Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye – 1, Olaylar – Belgeler, 1945 – 1952*, 281, 289.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 300; Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 188-9; NATO, "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey," [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17245.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17245.htm) (accessed April 21, 2011); These countries thought that the membership of Turkey to the NATO can make the Soviets aggressive and could led to a new war in Europe. (Armaoglu, *Belgelerle Turk-Amerikan Munasebetleri*, 188.)

of dollars from its budget and, more importantly, had surrendered a key element of its foreign policy: *neutrality*.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 149.

## CONCLUSION

The change in Turkey's neutrality policy gained momentum after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death in 1938. While Atatürk only believed in an independent republic and economy, his inheritors had seen the American aid and the support as the only savior of Turkey. This country, which declared its independence by fighting against the Western powers in 1923, now was asking them for help. Thanks to improvident politicians, just to get these aids and to defend the country against possible Soviet attack, Turkey had been left to the hands of the Americans. In a short time, all important positions in state institutions were filled by officers specially trained in the U.S.A. to secure American benefits.

Turkey's neutrality was wiped out with the signing of the tripartite treaty with Britain and France in 1939, its economy became dependent on Western powers with its entrance to the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) in 1947 and the independence of the Turkish army was lost with accession to NATO in 1952.<sup>89</sup>

Turkey's geopolitical importance was understood by the Soviets and the Americans. However, the Soviet land claims on the northern borders and their demands on the straits caused an antipathy in the Turkish public and the government. These demands helped pro-American lobbies, and with the help of the press and the politicians, Turkey chose to be on the side of the Americans rather than the Soviets during and after the Cold War.

Turkish-American relations closed up more after Turkey's accession to NATO. However most of the agreements between these two countries were signed secretly without the information of the Turkish parliament. Thanks to these agreements, the U.S. gained important rights, such as to be able to establish airbases in Turkey. In fact, in 1962 when the Soviets had decided to install missiles in Cuba with the ability to hit the U.S., the Americans responded with a blockade and embargo of the island. As a reaction, the U.S. decided to install missiles in Europe to threaten the Soviets. Most of the NATO members did not want to provoke the Soviets by giving Americans permission to place missiles in their lands. Yet, the Turkish government let the Americans place missiles inside the Turkish borders which had the capability to hit Moscow. This was considered as a threat by the Soviet Union. Immediately, the Soviets noted that in case of an American attack on

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<sup>89</sup> Zeynep Erdinc, "The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund-Turkey Relations and 19th Stand-By Arrangement," *Dumlupınar University Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 18 (August 2007): 2, <http://sbe.dumlupinar.edu.tr/18/99.pdf> (accessed April 24, 2011).

Cuba, they would attack Turkey without hesitation. Turkey became a pawn between these two superpowers, and the Turkish people were jeopardized for an American action that took place thousands of kilometers away.<sup>90</sup>

However, starting with the late 60s thanks to the development of the multiparty regime and the independent media, the public awakened. Especially in the leadership of the socialist university students, anti-Americanism started to spread throughout the country. Youths began to see the real sides of the Turkish-American agreements and realized that these were against Turkey's independence. When the American Navy seamen came with the *Missouri* approximately fifteen years prior, they were welcomed. Indeed, now they were being protested against with "Yankee go home!" and other disparaging remarks. However, these opposition voices were silenced with a bloody military coup that took place in 1980, and Turkey once again found itself in the U.S. sphere of influence.<sup>91</sup>

Since becoming a multi-party regime in 1950, forty-two governments have been in power in Turkey. No matter if the governments were formed by socialist, religious, conservative or liberal parties, the quest for American help and support never ended. Despite cries to the contrary, the Yankee never went back home.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye, 1945-1960*, 246.

<sup>91</sup> Muzaffer Kaya, "Turkiye'de Anti Emperyalist Mucadele 1965 – 1971," *Journal of Historical Studies* 4, (2006): 5.  
[http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/grad/Issue\\_4/Kaya,%20Muzaffer\\_Turkiyede%20Antiempyalist%20Mucadele.pdf](http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/grad/Issue_4/Kaya,%20Muzaffer_Turkiyede%20Antiempyalist%20Mucadele.pdf) (accessed April 24, 2011); Sinan Meydan, "6. Filoyu Kible Bilip Neden Namaz Kildiniz," OdaTV, <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=6.-filoyu-kible-bilip-neden-namaz-kildiniz-1512101200> (accessed April 25, 2011).

<sup>92</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Chronological List of Turkish Governments," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chronological-list-of-turkish-governments.en.mfa> (accessed April 24, 2011).

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